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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
ACQUISITION OF LOCAL SERVICE CARRIER BY
TRUNKLINE CARRIER
N the Continental-PioneerAcquisition case,' a sharply divided Civil Aeronautics Board approved the first merger of a trunkline carrier and a
local service carrier. The dissenters strongly attacked the decision as being
an intentional departure from the policy of separation of these carriers
constituting a direct threat to the future of the local service industry. 2
While the majority's "exception" rationale is subject to criticism, the decision
would not seem to indicate any intentional modification of the local service
theory. The effect that the decision will have on the future of the new
Continental-Pioneer Airlines and 'the local service industry in general would
seem to turn on whether the Board will consider the new carrier to be a
trunkline, a local service carrier, or a new and special class of hybrid.
In the instant case, Continental Air Lines, a regional trunkline carrier
operating from Colorado and Kansas throughout the Southwest, and Pioneer
Air Lines, a local service carrier operating in Texas and New Mexico,
applied to the CAB for approval of an agreement to merge. 3 In spite of
the long standing policy of separation of trunkline and local service carriers,
the merger was approved. 4 The Board unequivocally denied any intention
to depart from its previous policy, stating that the decision was an exception
to the policy of separation and was based on the substantial degree of similarity in the operational 5 and economic" characteristics of the carriers 7
together with the fact that the other aspects of the transaction were consistent or affirmatively beneficial to the public interest.8
In order to evaluate the rationale and significance of the opinion it is
1 CCH AVIATION L. REP., 11 21,782 (Dec. 7, 1954); reconsideration denied

11 21,811 (Mar. 17, 1955.)
2 See dissenting opinions of Members Lee and Adams. Dissenters also disagreed on the issues of: 1. improvement in service, 2. purchase price set-off against

mail pay, 3. rental allowance in mail pay for leased aircraft, 4. effect on Continental's financial position and 5. elimination of local carrier.
352 STAT. 937-1030 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §408(a) (2), 412(a), 401(i) (1953).
4

Approval of a merger is required unless it is inconsistent with the public

interest, creates a monopoly, restrains competition, or jeopardizes another carrier.
Supra, note 3, at §408(b).
5 OperationalCharacteristics:

CAL

PAL
69.3
Average length of flight
143
100
Average length of passenger journey
395
280
Source: Initial Decision of Thomas L. Wren, Examiner, Served July 15,
1954, Docket #6457, p. 23.
Average length of haul

6 FinancialRatios:

Mail revenue per mail ton mile
Percentage mail rev. of total operating
revenues

77.4

CAL
$2.07
9.70%

PAL
$13.71
43.02%

Operating cost/revenue ton mile flown
65.55c
101.36c
Source: Supra, note 5.
7 In addition similiar characteristics were found in geographic and size fac-

tors and traffic characteristics. Supra, note 5.
8 The Board found that the merger would not result in a monopoly or injure
any other carrier; it would result in a rational, integrated and economical route
pattern; the labor conditions and purchase price were satisfactory; the affirmative
benefits would result in improved service to the public; substantial savings would

be obtained through integration and elimination of facilities; reduction in mail
pay. Supra, note 1.
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necessary to consider the theory underlying the local service,9 from which
arises the distinction between trunkline and local service carriers and the
policy of separation.
The local service branch of the domestic air transportation system was
established after the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act at a time when
the existing air routes of the country served only relatively large population
centers. The carriers performing air transportation then have become, for
the most part, the trunklines of today. The local service was intended to
extend air transportation to the smaller communities of the nation, and in
so doing was to serve a dual purpose. In its "local" aspect' o it was to offer
air transportation among the smaller communities and their large metropolitan centers; in its "feeder" aspect" it was to serve in bringing the
12
long-haul trunkline traffic into the major terminals by air. In initiating
13
the local service the Board was faced with two problems: 1) the selection
of an appropriate carrier to perform the new service and 2) the adoption
of measures to insure the proper operation of the service, and to prevent
potential competition.
As to the first problem, the board adopted the policy of favoring independent carriers rather than existing trunkline carriers for the certification
of these routes. This decision involved an evaluation of the probability of
effective development and successful performance of the service by each
class of carrier. Recognizing that an unusually intensive effort would be
required to develop this new and admittedly inadequate market, the Board
thought that the independent was the better choice because it could devote
all of its time to the service and would be dependent solely upon it for
continued existence. 14 It was believed that the trunkline would probably
not expend the necessary effort because of its long-haul commitments, and
that if it did attempt to perform the service it would jeopardize its development of long-haul traffic and indirectly its attainment of self-sufficiency.' 5
Moreover, it was thought that through necessity or design, the trunkline
might neglect the local service for the more profitable long-haul service, or
concentrate on only the more profitable segments of the local routes.' 6
9 For detailed history and development of the local-feeder experiment see,
Zook, Certification of Local and Feeder Air Carriers, 7 Sw.L.J. 185 (1953);
Grunder, Experimental Certificates Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 17 J. Air L.
236 (1950) ; Ray, The Feeder Airline Story, 16 J. Air L. 379 (1949).
10 For discussion of this aspect see, 1950 Report of American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law, 17 J. Air L. 467 (1950).
11 See, B. E. Cole, Feeder Air Routes, 11 J. Air L. 17 (1940) for discussion
stressing this aspect.
12 The CAB originally authorized experimentation with one route in order to
study the results of the proposed service. Continental Air Lines, Inc., Texas Air
Service, 4 CAB 478 (1943). The following year it approved the concept. Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service, 6 CAB 1 (1944).
13 The Board found its authority for establishing the service under §401 (a)
of the C.A.A., and its duty to regulate the new service under §401 (b) of the act.
Supra, note 3.
14 "Greater effort and the exercise of managerial ingenuity may be expected
from an independent local operator whose continuation in the air transportation
business will be dependent upon the successful development of traffic ... and the
operation of the service on an adequate economical basis." Service in the Rocky
Mountain States Area, 6 CAB 695, 736-7.(1946); See also, West Coast Case, 6
CAB 961 (1946).
15 "While recognizing that existing scheduled carriers could provide service
to additional cities through amendment of their certificates, we do not believe that
it is in the public interest for a trunkline carrier to handicap the direct fast
service which its long-haul passengers require by attempting to fulfill functions
peculiarly adapted to a feeder operation. Texas-Oklahoma Case, 7 CAB 481, 495
(1946).
16 See: Florida Case, 6 CAB 765, 786 (1946); Wisconsin Central Renewal
Case, Order Ser. No. E-5951 (1951); Reopened Additional California-Nevada
Service Case, Order Ser. No. E-6040 (1952).
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Another factor favoring the independent was their interest and experience
in the areas which would result in a more intimate knowledge of the area

and its transportation needs. 17 Finally, with respect to the "feeder" aspect
of the service, the Board desired all trunklines to derive benefit and an
equal opportunity to obtain the traffic destined for further long-haul transportation, and thought that a trunkline performing the local service might
be inclined to discriminate in favor of itself in obtaining this traffic.18
The second problem arose after and as a consequence of the decision to
favor independents for the local service. The CAB recognized that the
local carriers would be able to operate as trunklines by the simple expedient
of skipping the intermediate stops between major terminals. This would
not only defeat the purpose of providing local service, but would also constitute a competitive threat to the trunklines. 19 The Board resolved this
problem by imposing certain restrictions on the local service carriers. The
condition was imposed in their certification that they serve each intermediate
point and each terminal point on each schedule operated. 20 In addition, the
local was directed to concentrate on developing the traffic at intermediate
points and not to attempt to eliminate or minimize the elapsed time between
the local carrier to
terminals. 21 Finally the Board has generally required
22

use DC-3 equipment in performing its operations.

Thus it is apparent that there are two basic distinctions between a
trunkline carrier and a local service carrier. The first lies in the physical
characteristics of its routes and the city populations served, and the second,
in the operational restrictions which are imposed upon the local carrier.
With few exceptions, the Board has followed a strict policy of separation
of these two classes of carriers. While the general purpose underlying the
policy is to insure the operation of each type of service by the appropriate
carrier, the policy necessarily embodies all of the considerations underlying
the local service theory 23 from which the distinctions between the classes

arose.
In the instant case, the majority found that unique similarity in the
operational and economic characteristics of a trunkline carrier and local
service carrier warranted exception to the policy of separation. In other
words, the Board reasoned that since Continental was not a clear cut trunk17 "In establishing local feeder service it is our policy to authorize operations
by local companies whose interests are centered in the area in which they will
provide service." West Coast Case, 6 CAB 961, 996 (1946). In the case of an
organized independent the Board considered its established good will in the area
as an inducing factor. See, Middle Atlantic Area Case, 9 CAB 131, 178 (1948).
18 Investigation of Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service. Supra note 12.

19 Supra, note 18.
20 Continental Air Lines, Inc., Texas Air Service, 4 CAB 478 (1943). The
CAB has modified these conditions under certain circumstances. See, Poineer Air
Lines, Inc., Amendment, 7 CAB 469 (1946); Middle Atlantic Area Case, 10 CAB
41 (1949).
21 Supra, note 20 at 485.
22 While the CAB does not expressly require the use of DC-3 equipment, this
is achieved through authorization for mail pay, which is withheld if an economical
aircraft is not operated. Pioneer Air Lines, Mail Rate, Order Serial No. E-7225,
13 Mar. 1953. For recent exception however, see Southwest Airways Co., Mail
Rate, Order Serial No. E-8757, 10 Nov. 1954.
23 In the instant case the dissenters contend that one of the reasons for maintaining the separation is as a concession to the trunklines for their co-operation
in surrendering segments of their routes in aid of the local feeder experiment.
The assertion does not seem to be substantiated by the cited authority, BonanzaTWA Route Transfer, 10 CAB 895 (1949). For a contra view on the issue of
trunkline co-operation see, Netterville, Local Service Airlines: Trunkline Suspensions in Aid of the Local Service Experiment, 26 So. Calif. L. Rev. 229 (1953).
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line carrier 24 and Pioneer not a clear cut local service carrier, 25 and further
since the carriers had such uniquely similar characteristics, the policy of
separation was not applicable. It is submitted that the fallacy in the
Board's reasoning lies in its assumption that the distinction between a
trunkline carrier and a local service carrier lies in operational and economic
characteristics. In so far as these factors are affected by physical route
characteristics and structure they do bear on the distinction between the
two classes, but this is not the only distinction between the trunkline and
local carrier. In making this assumption the factor of operational restrictions is overlooked, and this factor constitutes as significant a distinction
between the classes as basic route structure. In ignoring this factor, which
is an integral part of the local service theory and the policy of separation,
the soundness of the Board's conclusion that an exception to the policy of
separation was warranted is subject to question.
Apart from any technical departure from policy, the Board's rationale
in the instant case also subjects its findings of public interest to question.
Having concluded that the carriers were similar, the Board treated the case
as it would any other merger, 20 considering whether it would: (1) result
in an integrated, rational and economical route pattern, (2) suppress competition and injure another carrier, (3) involve a satisfactory transfer
price and (4) protect the interests of labor, but the Board did not consider
the effect of retaining the local carrier restrictions on the old Pioneer
routes. 27 This failure is understandable in view of the rationale of the
decision, but adherence to Board policy would seem to have required consideration of the following additional factors: (1) the losses which may be
sustained through presumptively less efficient operations of the Continental
trunkline routes, (2) the effect of reducing the average length of haul of
routes, (3) the competitive effect of discriminative "feeding" and (4)
benefits derived from discriminative "feeding." With respect to the first
point, the decision announces that the old Continental routes were very
similar to the old Pioneer routes, but yet the latter will be operated under
local service restrictions. Underlying the policy of favoring the independent
for local service routes is the presumption that a trunkline will jeopardize
its long-haul operations by attempting to perform both trunkline and local
service operations. Continental does have some long-haul routes, and those
routes which are relatively short could be operated on a non-stop trunkline
basis. In this case, with the economic condition of Continental far from
24 Continental had 8 round-trips that should be classified as trunkline-type
service. The average length per hop on these flights is 358 miles. It has 11 roundtrip flights with an overall average length per hop of 97 miles. This compares with
the average length per hop of 82 miles for Pioneer's 10 round-trip local service
flights. "Bureau Counsel asserts that Continental is more nearly akin to the
larger local service carriers than to a trunkline carrier. He points out that in
1953 Continental's revenue plane miles exceeded the average of the 3 largest
feederlines by 68% while the next largest trunkline's average exceeded Continental's total by 116%." Supra, note 5 at 24.
25 The average length of haul and city population served exceeded the average
of the local service carrier. Supra, note 5.
26 These have been the factors considered by the Board in all cases of proposed

mergers. See in general, Zook, Recasting Air Route Pattern by Airline Consolida-

tion and Mergers, 21 J. Air L. 293 (1954).
27 The implication from the instant case is that the old Pioneer routes will
continue to be operated under local service restrictions. The diversionary effect
evidence of Trans-Texas and Central was considered irrelevant because based
on anticipated changes in Pioneer's operations. Also, the justification for allowing
Continental access to the Dallas-Fort Worth market after having refused it in
the Wichita Falls-Dallas case was that Continental was now operating it on a

local service basis.
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favorable, 28 the possibility of losses in the trunkline routes should be a
major consideration. Secondly, since long-haul operations are more profitable than short it seems that Continental is apt to sustain further losses
through the reduction in overall average length of haul caused by the merger.28a Third, another reason for favoring the operation of local routes by
independents was to preclude the possibility of discriminate "feeding." With
Continental operating the local service route, it will obviously route the
further trunkline traffic over its own system. This factor should be considered in relation to the issue of the competitive impact of the merger on
other carriers. 29 Fourth, while discriminative "feeding" will take place, it
will have a beneficial effect on the trunkline segments and may offset,
through' increased traffic density, any losses occasioned by presumptive
losses considered in 1 and 2 above. If the reasons for the Board's original
local service theory had basis in fact, the criticism of the majority's decision in the instant case is that it overlooks pertinent factors bearing on
the public interest.3 0 It may well be that under the particular facts of this
case these considerations are negligible or cancel themselves out, but the
fact remains that they should have been considered in reaching a reliable
determination on public interest.
Accepting the majority's finding that the merger was in the public
interest, the decision can be criticized for its failure to anticipate the
problems which it raises and their possible effect on the future of Continental-Pioneer and the local service industry in general. In effect, the majority
carrier whose route structure and operadecision has created a hybrid -a
tional characteristics are so "unique" as to warrant its performance as
both a trunkline and local service carrier. This involves an immediate effect
on Continental-Pioneer because of the consequences of classification. While
the Board may be creating an artificial distinction between trunkline and
local service carriers through the imposition of operational restrictions on
the local service carriers, the fact remains that these restrictions exist and
will have to be reckoned with. The local service carriers are required to
make all stops on their routes-the trunklines need not; the local carriers
are directed not to minimize the elapsed time between terminals-the
trunklines are encouraged to minimize these periods; the local carriers
have been limited to the use of DC-3 equipment-the trunklines have no
restrictions on equipment. Being a hybrid carrier, will Continental-Pioneer
be eligible in the future for a clear-cut trunkline or a clear-cut local service
route extension, or will it be limited to those routes which are consistent
with its present "unique" structure? If a new route is granted what type
28

"The inability of Continental to attain self-sufficiency despite the currently

high level of earnings prevailing throughout virtually the entire domestic trunk-

line industry may be an impediment to the development of the sound air transportation system envisaged by Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act." Continental

Air Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Air Lines, Inc., Order Serial No. E-7977, 17 Dec. 1953.
28a Operating Results, Calendar 1954
CAL

PAL

Traffic Density-Rev. Ton-Miles:
8.5
16.6
Per route mile per Day
583.0
1267.0
Per Station per Day
401
277
Length of Passenger Haul (miles)
Source: Dissenting Opinion Member Adams
29 While the Board did not consider the discriminative "feeding" issue as
such it did consider diversion which it estimated at a total of $103,401. Also
it noted that only 3 carriers requiring subsidies would be effected-Braniff,
Trans-Texan and Central. Supra, note 5 at 26 and 54.

30 There have only been two instances of exception to the local service theory
in the past where trunklines were permitted to operate local routes and both
had unfavorable results. Great Lakes Area Case, 8 CAB 360, (1947); Parks
Investigation Case, 11 CAB 779 (1950).
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of equipment will be authorized for its operation? Will the decision turn
on whether the new route is a logical extension of an existing trunkline or
local service route? If the logical extension criterion is adopted then the
carrier will be moving toward one classification, and as soon as this occurs
the basis for the exception of the case is destroyed, for no longer are its
characteristics so "unique" as to justify both trunkline and local service
operations by the same carrier. When the carrier begins to take on the
characteristics of either a trunk or local will it be required to surrender its
other class routes? It would seem that the only way it can retain its present
status as a hybrid is by keeping its present structure constant. To stunt
the future development of the carrier by not allowing any change would
obviously neither be in the carrier's nor public's interest. The alternate
solution to allowing growth without destroying the peculiar characteristics
of the carrier, would be through the authorization of only special "hybridtype" routes or the granting of a compensatory local service route whenever
a trunkline route is granted.
The effect of this decision on the future of the local service industry
would seem to turn on the manner in which the Board treats ContinentalPioneer. Assuming the Board will continue to adhere to its local service
theory it would seem that it will have to treat Continental-Pioneer as a
trunkline or local service carrier temporarily, or attempt to create a new
and special class of hybrid carrier. The most undesirable position for the
Board to take would be to continue to treat the new carrier as a hybrid
allowing unrestricted growth toward trunk or local service carrier overlooking the theoretical conflict of the local service theory. The trunklines
have always been concerned with the potential threat of the local growing
into another competitive trunkline and the decision here would seem to
offer the precedent for a particular trunkline eliminating the threat of a
potentially competing local carrier through merger. The Board's criterion
for such a merger is "similarity of economic and operational3 ' characteristics" plus affirmative benefits.3 2 It would seem that a merger of any trunk
and local carrier operating in the same general region with some common
cities would result in savings and economies through integration and elimination of duplicative facilities. This would leave only the "similarity"
factor to be contended with. Since most of the trunklines have some local
carrier characteristics perhaps the elimination of some segment along the
trunk route would bring about operational and economic characteristics
sufficiently similar to meet the standard of this case. Then too, since there
is no definite standard of how similar the carriers have to be in order to
warrant the doctrine of the instant case, perhaps the economic benefits of
a particular merger might subordinate the similarity factor. Any sacrifice
which would be made by a trunk initially would seem to be outweighed by
the advantages of eliminating a local service carrier and achieving the
coveted position of hybrid- which allows optional development as either
a trunkline or local service carrier and the advantages of discriminative
"feeding."
It seems certain that the Board will have to define the status of Continental-Pioneer in the near future. As a possible solution, it is submitted
that the most reasonable position for the Board to take is to treat the
carrier temporarily as either a basic trunkline or local service carrier,
allowing changes to be made on the basis of a "logical extension of an existing route" test. When the hybrid carrier begins to move toward one classification or the other it should be required to surrender the other class of
31 Supra notes 5, 6 and 7.
32

Supra note 8.
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routes. While this may conceivably create some problems in the future, 33
and it would seem should have been provided for as a condition in the
approval of the merger, it would seem more favorable than attempting to
create and maintain a special classification of hybrid.

Northwest Airlines Inc. et al. v. Glenn L. Martin Company
3 Avi. 17,683
Facts: The facts of this case were as follows: Northwest Airlines Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as "Northwest," purchased from Glenn L. Martin
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Martin," a number of "Model 202"
aircraft designed and manufactured by Martin. After these aircraft had
flown approximately five per cent of their expected service life a structural
defect resulted in the total destruction of one of the aircraft with all
persons aboard and the grounding of all Models 202 for the required structural changes. It was shown conclusively that the defective part was a
joint in the front spar of the wings. This defect was caused by what is
known as metal fatigue which is governed by the type of metal, its configuration and surface condition and the amount of repeated load as related to
the strength of the material for one load. The agreement covering the
purchase of the aircraft in effect limited Martin's liability to that "imposed
on it by law for its negligence."
The Trial Court heard Northwest's claim for damages resulting from
the loss of the crashed aircraft and the loss of use of certain other aircraft
while the structural fault was being eliminated. This claim was based on
certain allegations of misfeasance and nonfeasance by Martin amounting
to negligence in the design and manufacture of the aircraft. Martin's
defense was that it had used great care but that if negligence was found
then Northwest had assumed the risk or had been guilty of contributory
negligence. These alternate defense pleas were based on the opportunity
Northwest had to inspect the aircraft in the process of production, Martin
arguing that the difference between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence as delineated in the cases was merely one of degree-between
risks so obvious they must be taken to have been known to the plaintiff
and those slightly less obvious which the plaintiff might have discovered
by the exercise of ordinary care. Martin also alleged contributory negligence
by Northwest for not installing airborne radar which might have prevented
the accident. The jury returned general verdicts in favor of Martin.
Northwest appealed on the following grounds:
1. That the Trial Court should have found Martin negligent as a matter
of law and therefore that the question of negligence should not have been
submitted to the jury. 2. That the Trial Court was in error in submitting
to the jury the issue as to whether Northwest was barred from recovery
because of its assumption of risk as there was no evidence to support such
a contention. 3. That for the same reason the issue of contributory negligence by Northwest should not have been submitted to the jury, either with
respect to Northwest's failure to observe the defect or to install radar in
its aircraft.
The Appeal Court held that the question of lack of ordinary care by
Martin was certainly sufficiently doubtful to warrant its submission to the
jury. On the second plea raised by Northwest it held, with one judge
dissenting, that as there was a complete absence of evidence that Northwest
s Apart from possible objections on the part of the carrier to surrendering
routes there would be the legal question of whether a suspension would be warranted under the Act. Supra, note 3 at §401(h).

